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Judicial Experience Under the
Federal Tort Claims Act1
For convenience in discussing the cases, no attempt has been
made to follow the sections of the act in the order in which they
appear.
2
COVERAGE
The act makes the United States Government liable for the
torts of its employees3 except in twelve enumerated classes of
claims,4 on the doctrine of respondeat superior,5 and the district
courts have jurisdiction of all claims without regard to minimum
or maximum jurisdictional amount." Little difficulty is evidenced
in the reported cases in disposing of claims not sounding in tort,
but it was necessary in one case to hold that a claim for unpaid
wages and bonus under an employment contract with the army
transport service was not within the scope of the act.7 The federal
government has never waived its sovereign immunity with respect
to liability for damages arising from the invasion of rights pro-
1 28 U.S.C.A. §§1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680;
60 STAT. 842 et seq. (1946), 61 STAT. 722 et seq. (1947), 28 U.S.C. §921 et
seq. (1946).
'For a discussion of administrative procedure under the act see
Walker, Administrative Settlement of Claims under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 9 OHio ST. L.J. 445 (1948).
3 "Subject to the provisions of chapter 173 (the chapter numbers were
changed in the Senate amendments to H.R. 3214 and this number now
refers to chapter 171 entitled 'Tort Claims Procedure,' 28 U.S.C.A. §2671
et seq. of the new judicial code, approved June 25, 1948) of this title, the
district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States for money damages, for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable. .. ." 28 U.S.C.A. §1346
,(b) (1948), 28 U.S.C. §931 (1946); accord, Long v. United States, 78 F.
Supp. 35 (S.D. Cal. 1948) (government liable only on basis of respondeat
superior); Lundy v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Fla. 1948) (Towing
an airplane on a highway does not constitute a wrongful act so as to permit
recovery regardless of negligence).
428 U.S.C.A. §2680 (1948), 60 STAT. 845, §421 (1946), 28 U.S.C. §943
(1946).
5 Long v. United States, supra note 3.
6 Bates v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 57 (D. Neb. 1948).
7 Jentry v. United States, 73 F.. Supp. 899 (S.D. Cal. 1947). See 28
U.S.C.A. §2680 (d) (1948), which exempts admiralty claims.
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tected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, except for claims for
property taken without just compensation for which an action will
lie in the Court of Claims," and the act expressly denies such con-
sent.'
Employee acting within the scope of his employment 0 includes
members of the armed forces acting in line of duty.1 However,
the agency problem still exists with members of the armed forces.
It has been held that a naval recruiting officer returning home in
his own automobile after a recruiting broadcast was not perform-
ing any special or general duty and was not, therefore, acting in
the line of duty.12 On the other hand, sailors traveling under gov-
ernment orders who had left their train to obtain refreshments
were held to be acting in line of duty and the government held
liable for injuries caused when one of the sailors bumped into an
elderly woman while running to catch the departing train." The
loaned servant doctrine has presented some difficulty. Where mili-
tary personnel were loaned to state schools to teach military sci-
ence, liability depended upon the benefits conferred as between
state and nation, and extent of control of the military personnel
over the equipment; therefore, the government's motion for sum-
mary judgment was overruled.14 But if equipment alone is loaned
and is operated by agents not subject to the control of the govern-
ment, no liability ensues even though the government contributes
the money out of which the employee's salary is paid. 5 It would
seem that the court's disregard of the benefit theory in the latter
case is explained by state law.'
The act exempts injuries arising from combatant activities of
military forces during time of war," but army training even during
time of war is not within this exemption. 8 In an action charging
"United States v. Causby, 66 Sup. Ct. 1062 (1946) (where the "tak-
ing" was by federal planes flying so low over the property that it could
no longer be used for raising of chickens).
9Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947); Ekberg v. United
States, 76 F. Supp. 99 (Court of Claims 1948); 28 U.S.C.A. §2680 (h)
(1948), 60 STAT. 845 §421 (h) (1946), 28 U.S.C. §943 (h) (1946).
10 28 U.S.C.A. §1346 (b) (1948), 60 STAT. 843 §410 (1946), as amended,
61 STAT. 722 §410 (1947), 28 U.S.C. §931 (1946).
1128 U.S.C.A. §2671 (1948), 60 STAT. 842 §402 (1946), 28 U.S.C. §941
(1946).
12Rutherford v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Tenn. 1947).
1' Campbell v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1948).
14 Cobb v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 713 (W.D. La. 1947).
15 Fries v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 396 (W.D. Ky. 1948).
16 Statt v. Louisville & N. R.R., 270 Ky. 787, 110 C.W. 2d 1086 (1937).
3.728 U.S.C.A. §2680 (j) (1948), 60 STAT. 845 §421 (j) (1946), 28 U.S.C.
§943 (j) (1946).
Is Skeels v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 372 (W.D. La. 1947).
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malpractice by a doctor assigned to the Veterans Administration,
the government's contention that the Veterans Administration
should receive the immunity accorded charitable institutions under
state law was refused as not applicable to the United States.19 Pay-
ment by the government of medical bills under 31 U.S.C.A. §223
(b) 20 is not a bar to an action' since there is no duplication of pay-
ments.2 1 Nor is award of compensation under the Federal Em-
ployees' Compensation Act,2 prior to the effective date of the Tort
Claims Act, a bar or waiver since alternative remedies were not in
existence and the compensation paid will be set off from any award
recovered.2
3
The status of service-incurred injuries under the act is not too
clear at the present time. Only one reported case has given a judg-
ment for the claimant; 24 however, another recent decision overruled
the government's motion for summary judgment, but reserved the
point for further consideration at the time of trial.25 The court held
that it is bound by ordinary rules of interpretation,2 6 and that Con-
gress left no uncertainty in defining and explaining the relationship
between members of the armed forces and the government, and in-
cluded such claims unless they arise out of combatant activities
during time of war.2 7 Similar reasoning was followed to reach the
same result in the Jefferson case28 when heard on the government's
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Judge Chesnut in the opinion
bases his argument, in part, on the words then appearing in the act:
".. .and render judgment on any claim against the United States."
(Emphasis supplied) .29 In the present provision of the new judicial
code, the modifying word "any" is omitted. 0 There is no reason
to believe that this trivial modification indicates any change of
legislative intent; nevertheless, it remains to be seen what attitude
our courts take in the future. However, before the present change,
10 Perucki v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 34 (M.D. Pa. 1948).
2057 STAT. 372 (1945), as amended, 59 STAT. 225 (1945), 60 STAT. 332
(1946), 61 STAT. 501 (1947), 31 U.S.C. §223 (b) (1946) (Settlement of
claims incident to activities of army or Department of the Army).
21 Wade v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 729 (D. Mass. 1948).
2239 STAT. 742 (1916), 5 U.S.C. §751 et seq. (1946). See Wagner v.
City of Duluth, 211 Minn. 252, 300 N.W. 820 (1941); Oklahoma City v. Caple,
187 Okla. 600, 105 P. 2d 209 (1940).
23Vhite v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 316 (D. N.J. 1948).
24 Stoddard v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 839 (D. Mass. 1948).
25Alansky v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 556 (D. Mont. 1948).
2 6 Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
2? Note 25 supra.
28Jefferson v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 209 (D. Md. 1947).
29*60 STAT. 843 §410 (a) (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 722 §410 (a)
(1947), 28 U.S.C. §931 (a) (1946).
30 28 U.S.C.A. §1346 (b) (1948).
1948]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
if indeed it is, was made, Judge Chesnut had reversed his previous
holding on the trial of the case on its merits.31 The reasons assigned
for reaching a different conclusion of law were: (a) the purpose
of the act was to relieve Congress of the onerous task of private
bills to compensate for common law tort claims and not service-
connected injuries which are already provided for;32 and (b) there
is a distinctive government-soldier relation recognized by the Su-
preme Court. 3
STATUTE oF LiIATIONS
The act incorporates its own statute of limitations which bars
claims against the United States unless an action is begun within
one year after such claim accrues* The act was made retroactive
to permit suits on causes of actions accruing on or after January
1, 1945,3 and if the cause of action accrued prior to January 1, 1945,
relief may not be had under the act.3 0 Virtually all of the difficulty
encountered in determining whether the state statute of limitations
should apply by virtue of the provision in the act making the
United States liable ". . . in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred", 7 has now disappeared. The
1946 act was made retroactive to include actions accruing on or
after January 1, 1945, and actions could be brought ". . . within
one year after such claim accrued or within one year after August
2, 1946, whichever is later ..."31 (Emphasis supplied). Tort claims
are barred in many states in one year, and the government con-
tended that since an individual could not be sued after one year,
and since the government is liable only to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances, 9 then the claim against
3' Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 1948).32SE1. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1946); H. R. REP. No.
1675, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
33United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
3428 U.S.C.A. §2401 (b) (1948), 60 STAT. 845 §420 (1946), 28 U.S.C.
§942 (1946). But see, Bay State Crabmeat Co. v. United States, 78 F. Supp.
131 (D. Mass. 1948). Where a libel in admiralty was filed against the United
States within one year after the damage was inflicted, libelant may amend
the complaint so as to strike all references to libel and to admiralty and
present a claim for damages as of the date the original pleading was filed,
notwithstanding that more than one year had elapsed since the cause of
action accrued.
35 60 STAT. 843 §410 (a) (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 722 (1947), 28
U.S.C. §921 (a) (1946).
-6 Edwards v. United States, 163 F. 2d 268 (C.C.A. 9th 1947).
3728 U. S. C. A. §1346 (b) (1948), 60 STAT. 843 §410 (a) (1946), as
amended, 61 STAT. 722 §410 (a) (1947), 28 U.S.C. §931 (a) (1946).
38 60 STAT. 845 §420 (1946), 28 U.S.C. §942 (1946).
3928 U.S.C.A. §2674 (1948), 60 STAT. 843 §410 (a) (1946), as amended,
61 STAT. 722 §410 (a) (1947), 28 U.S.C. §931 (1946).
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the United States must also be barred after one year from the date
claim arose according to state law, notwithstanding the alternative
provision of the act permitting an action one year after August 2,
1946.40 One district court sustained the government's contention
and dismissed the action;41 on appeal the decision was reversed.42
Judge Parker speaking for the court said, "We think, however,
that the purpose and effect of the language of the statute is that we
shall look to the law of the state for the purpose of defining the
actionable wrong for which liability shall exist on the part of the
United States, but to the act itself for the limitations of time within
which action shall be instituted to enforce the liability." 3 Judge
Parker further pointed out that the subsequent history of the act
also indicates that the limitation of the act itself must govern.
For states whose wrongful death statutes permit only punitive dam-
ages, an amending statute was passed" granting compensatory dam-
ages and extending the period for suit in such cases for an addi-
tional year, or until August 2, 1948.45 Similar results were reached
in the other reported cases in which the issue was raised.4 6
If any doubt remained as to the controlling effect of the limita-
tions provided by the act itself, the mere passage of time has re-
moved that doubt. In the new judicial code the alternative provi-
sion was dropped because already executed. 47
In an action alleging a continuing nuisance or continuing tres-
pass where the nuisance or trespass began before the effective date
of the act, a complaint for damages for the continuing trespass may
be maintained for damages after the effective date of the act.48
A different problem is presented in determining when a cause
of action arises between an insured and his insurer. An army
bomber struck the Empire State Building. At the time individuals
could not bring an action against the government. Plaintiffs were
paid compensation under the New York compensation law which
provided that if the individual did not bring an action within six
40 See note 38 supra.
42-Maryland v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 982 (D. Md. 1947Y.42 Maryland v. United States, 165 F. 2d 869 (C.C.A. 4th 1947).
+3Maryland v. United States, id., at 871.
4461 STAT. 722 §410 (a) (1947), 28 U.S.C. §931 (a) (1946).
45Pub. L. No. 324, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. (Aug. 1, 1947).
40 Sweet v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Cal. 1947); Wiltse v.
United States, 74 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. La. 1947); Kahn v. United States, 75
F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Cal. 1948) (State statute of limitations not part of the
substantive common law right to recover for personal injuries caused by
negligence. Act does not purport to adjust local remedial law in conflict
with provisions of the act).
47 28 U.S.C.A. §2401 (b) (1948). See reviser's notes TrrLE 28, U. S.
CODE CONGRESSIONAL SEavicE §2401 (1948).48Lemaire v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 498 (D. Mass. 1948).
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months his failure operated as an assignment of the cause of action
to the insurance carrier. 9 The New York Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law was amended to permit an action against a third party
to be commenced not later than nine months after the enactment
of a law creating, establishing, or affording a new or additional
remedy.", It was held that the cause of action did not accrue until
the effective date of the Tort Claims Act and did not pass to the
Commissioners of the state fund until nine months after the date
of the federal act. Immunity of the United States implies that no
substantive right of action existed against it and not that there was
merely a procedural impediment against its enforcement. 51
PROCEDURE
Procedure under the Tort Claims Act is governed by the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.5 - Now that the Tort Claims Act has
been made a part of the judicial code a repetition of such provision
is unnecessary and has been eliminated.53
Ordinarily a statute of limitation must be pleaded, but because
the right to sue the government did not exist at common law and
is created by a statute which makes the bringing of an action
within a specified time a condition precedent to the existence of
the cause of action, it may be raised by motion in an action under
the Tort Claims Act.5
4
Payment of clerk's fees is a prerequisite of filing a petition under
the act, and unless an action is seasonably commenced, the court
lacks jurisdiction. 5 Acceptance of an award of federal compensa-
tion before the effective date of the Tort Claims Act does not con-
stitute an election or waiver since alternative remedies were not
then in existence.56 Payment of medical bills by the government
is not a bar to a subsequent action under this act because there is
49 N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §29 (2) (1946).
50 N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §29 (1) (Supp. 1948).
51 Commissioners of Ins. Fund v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 549 (S.D.
N.Y. 1947). Cf. Reed Co., Inc., v. International Container Corp., 43 F. Supp.
644 (S.D. N.Y. 1942) (New York law action accrued when plaintiff first
became entitled to maintain the action); Oldford v. Moran Towing Corp.,
186 Misc. 46, 60 N.Y.S. 2d 924 (Sup. 1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 822, 60
N.Y.S. 2d 52 (2d Dept. 1948).
5260 STAT. 844 §411 (1946), 28 U.S.C. §932 (1946).
53 SEN. REP. No. 1559, amendment No. 61 (1948). TITLE 28, U. S. CODE
CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE 1841 n. 41 (1948).
54 Sikes v. United States, 8 F.R.D. 34 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
55 Turkett v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. N.Y. 1948). Smith
v. Johnson, 109 F. 2d 152 (C.C.A. 9th 1940); Rules 3 and 4, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. following §723 (c) (1946).
66 White v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 316 (D. N.J. 1948).
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no duplication of payments, 7 and payments made will be deducted
from any award recovered under this act.58 A complaint that al-
leges that the action arises under a law regulating interstate and
foreign commerce is too general to sustain jurisdiction.59 Even
though jurisdiction is not challenged by the individual defendant,
the court is under a duty to enforce its jurisdictional requirements
where the defect is on the record.6 0
Joinder of parties defendant has presented a difficult problem
and the courts are not at all in agreement on the proper solution.
In the majority of cases raising the question, the joinder of an
individual with the United States as a joint tortfeasor has been
permitted.61 The solution to the problem depends equally on who
attempts the joinder and on the existence of jurisdictional require-
ments, as well as on a determination of the proper interpretation
to be given the act itself.'
A sovereign is not suable except by its own consent; therefore,
an individual suing the United States has no constitutional right
to demand a jury trial, but must accept the method of trial granted,
by Congress. When an individual is joined. as a party defendant, he
is entitled, under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, to
a jury trial. In Englehardt v. United States," the plaintiff sued the!
United States and an individual as joint tortfeasors, and the in-!
dividual moved to dismiss the action. The government opposed
the motion in order that its right to contribution, as provided by
state law, 3 might be asserted. Judge Chesnut held that joinder
was not objectionable since only the individual could demand a
jury trial, and the flexibility afforded by the Federal Rules permits
separate trials where, in the discretion of the court, it is necessary
to avoid prejudice.8 4 As a practical matter, Judge Chesnut points out
that in the great majority of such tort actions, individual defendants
do not want a jury trial, but prefer trial by the court. While recog-
nizing that the leading case decided under the Tucker Act65 denied
joinder of an individual with the United States under that act, 6
57Wade v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 729 (D. Mass. 1948).
58 White v. United States, supra note 56.
59Bullock v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 445 (D. N.J. 1947).60Tbid.
61Englehardt v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1947); Bullock
v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 445 (D. N.J. 1947); Forrester v. United States,
75 F. Supp. 272 (E.D. Wis. 1947). Rule 20 (a), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 28 U.S.C. following §723 (c) (1946).
62See note 61 supra.
63MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 50, §§21-30 (Supp. 1943).
64 Rules 38, 39 and 42 (b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.
following §723 (c) (1946).
8528 U.S.C. §41 (20) (1946).
66 United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941).
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Judge Chesnut clearly indicates that the jurisdiction of the district
courts granted by the Tort Claims Act is far different from the
jurisdiction granted under the Tucker Act, and the interpretation
of the Tucker Act is not applicable to the Tort Claims Act.6 7 On
the other hand, Judge Chesnut found that the Suits in Admiralty
Act"8 is, in its grant of jurisdiction, almost identical with the Tort
Claims Act, and such joinder under the Suits in Admiralty Act is
common practice.8 9
For a plaintiff to join an individual as a joint tortfeasor, there
must be diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and the in-
dividual defendant,7 0 and presumably he must meet the $3,000 min-
imum requirement, although that point has not yet been decided.
The government cannot move to dismiss the action for want of
diversity to defeat liability by oblique attack, but may move to dis-
miss the individual on the theory that it acts on behalf of its em-
ployee.7'1 Misjoinder is no longer a ground for dismissal under the
67 ". . . as the jurisdiction of the district courts under the Tucker Act
is only concurrent with the Court of Claims, the district courts under the
Tucker Act likewise can have no jurisdiction in a suit against the United
States jointly with other defendants." Englehardt v. United States, 69 F.
Supp. 451, 453 (D. Md. 1947). "Furthermore while it is true, as pointed out
by the Supreme Court in the Sherwood case, that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure enacted long after the passage of the Tucker Act, could not ex-
tend the jurisdiction of the district courts under the act ... the Federal Tort
Claims Act does expressly provide that the procedure under the Act shall
be in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, one important
object of which was to expedite the final determination of litigation by in-
clusion in one suit of parties directly interested herein despite technical ob-
jections to such joinders previously existing in many situations." Engle-
hardt v. United States, supra at 454.
6841 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §742 (1946).
69 "Although I have failed to find any decided cases in which it has
been specifically held after consideration that other defendants than the
United States may be sued under the Suits in Admiralty Act there have
been numerous cases in which such situations have occurred without con-
test. It has been almost common practice in recent years in this court to
join in a suit against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act,
the maritime company or agency operating a merchant vessel under con-
tract with the United States." Englehardt v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 451,
453-454 (D. Md. 1947). The Cotati, 2 F. 2d 394 (S.D. N.Y. 1923); The Peer-
less, 2 F. 2d 395 (S.D. N.Y. 1923); W. P. Tanner-Gross and Co. v. Elwell and
Co., 2 F. 2d 396 (S.D. N.Y. 1924); Hidalgo Steel Co. v. Moore and McCormack
Co., 298 Fed. 331 (S.D. N.Y. 1923); Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575
(1943); Hust v. Moore & McCormack Lines, 328 U.S. 707 (1946); The
Everett Fowler, 151 F. 2d 662 (C.C.A. 2d 1945) .
7 0 Englehardt v. United States, supra note 69; Dickens v. Johnson, 71 F.
Supp. 753 (E.D. N.Y. 1947).
71 Dickens v. Johnson, supra note 70.
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Federal Rules,12 and the court by its own motion may order any
party dropped.73
The problem of joinder of parties defendant-by the plaintiff-
may not be of more than passing interest since any judgment
against the United States will be paid. The United States, on the
other hand, has very substantial interests in bringing the individual
tortfeasor into the action.74 Under the Federal Rules the defendant
may implead a third party who is or may be liable to him for all
or part of the plaintiff's claim against him.7 5 Since in a suit by the
United States the amount in controversy is immaterial70 and diver-
sity of citizenship is not required,7 7 the United States could bring
in any individual without regard for jurisdictional requirements
notwithstanding that the plaintiff could not in the first instance
because of some jurisdictional defect. Moreover, if the original
plaintiff could not, in the first instance, have joined the third party,
he may not amend his complaint to assert any claim against the
impleaded third party.78 It would seem that in justice to the orig-
inal plaintiff, who cannot assert a claim against the impleaded thira
party where diversity i9 lacking, that the impleaded third party
72 Rule 21, 28 U.S.C. following §723 (c) (1946).
73 Uarte v. United States, 7 F.R.D. 705 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
74 
"Thereupon after denial of the motion to dismiss the individual de-
fendant (Englehardt v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 451), the individual de-
fendant filed an answer to the complaint and prayed a jury trial. The case
then proceeded to trial with a jury as between the plaintiff and the individ-
ual defendant, J. D. Quillen, and the court as between the plaintiff and the
United States of America. The jurisdiction of the court in this case as
against the United States was the Federal Tort Claims Act, but as between
the plaintiff and the individual defendant, jurisdiction of the court was by
reason of diversity of citizenship. I might add, in connection with the
Englehardt case, that the jury found in favor of the plaintiff as against the
individual defendant J. D. Quillen in the sum of $3,000.00, and the court
found for the plaintiff against the United States for a like sum, each de-
fendant paying $1,500.00 of the judgment to the plaintiff." Letter from Mr.
James B. Murphy, Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Md.
July 29, 1948.
7 5 Rule 14 (a), 28 U.S.C. following §723 (c) (1946).
7836 STAT. 1091 (1911), 48 STAT. 775 (1934), 50 STAT. 738 (1937), 54
STAT. 143 (1940), 28 U.S.C. §41 (1) (1946); United States v. Conti, 27 F.
Supp. 756 (S.D. N.Y. 1939); Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Krauss, 12 F.
Supp. 44 (D. N.J. 1935).
77 1 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE §137 (2d ed. 1943).7&Hoskie v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Larrac Real Estate Corp.,
39 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. N.Y. 1941); Thompson v. Cranston, 2 F.R.D. 270
(W.D. N. Y. 1942), aff'd, 132 F. 2d 631 (C.C.A. 2d 1942), cert. denied, 319
U.S. 741 (1943); Saunders v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 9 Fed. Rules Serv. 14 a. 62,
case 2 (S.D. W. Va. 1945); Friend v. Middle Transportation Co., 153 F 2d
778 (C.C.A. 2d 1946), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 865 (1946); Comment, 46 MIcH.
L. REv. 1069, 1074 (1948).
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should also be precluded from asserting any claim against the orig-
inal plaintiff."'
Contribution is now permitted by court decision or statute in
a considerable number of states.8 Where state law permits contri-
bution between joint tortfeasors the original defendant has been
allowed to implead third parties as joint tortfeasors.8 1 But where
state law does not permit contribution between joint tortfeasors,
the defendant may not implead a joint tortfeasor 2
No reported case has involved an impleaded third party under
Rule 14, but in a case in the District Court for the District of Mary-
land, Civ. No. 3536, December 17, 1947, the United States was sued
under the Tort Claims Act and the government, under Rule 14, im-
pleaded two third party defendants. The third party defendants
prayed a jury trial. The government dismissed its action against
the individuals and there was no jury upon the trial of the case.,
Denying joinder, the most recent case in which the issue was
litigated presents virtually all of the arguments thus far directed
to the proposition. 4 These arguments briefly stated are: First, a
judgment against the United States is a bar to a subsequent action
against the employee and if Congress had intended that the em-
ployee, or any other joint tortfeasor, be a party, this provision would
be meaningless. Second, the act denies a jury trial88 to which an in-
dividual is entitled as a matter of right. Third, the legislative in-
tent expressed in the committee report of an identical provision of
79 Comment, 46 MIcH. L. REv. 1069, 1076 (1948).
80 La., Minn., Ore., and Pa. permit contribution between joint tort-
feasors without the aid of statutes. Twelve other states and the Territory
of Puerto Rico by statute: Ga., Kan., Ky., Md., Mich., Mo., N.M., N.Y.,
N.C., Texas, Va., W.Va. For a complete list of code sections see, Comment,
42 ILL. L. REV. 344, 356 n. 56 (1947).
81 Crum v. Applachian Elec. Power Co. v. Winisle Coal Co., 29 F. Supp.
90 (S.D. W.Va. 1939); Gray v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 31 F.
Supp. 299 (W.D. La. 1940), aff'd, 32 F Supp. 335 (W.D. La. 1940); Kravas v.
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 28 F. Supp. 66 (W.D. Pa. 1939).
82 Brown v. Cranston, 132 F. 2d 631 (W.D. N.Y. 1942), cert. denied sub.
nom., Cranston v. Thompson, 319 U.S. 741 (1943). Contra: Gatink v. Town-
ship of Holland, 28 F. Supp. 67 (D. N.J. 1939).
83 Letter from Mr. James B. Murphy, Assistant States Attorney,
for the District of Maryland, dated July 29, 1948.
84 Uarte v. United States, 7 F.R.D. 705 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
85 U.S. C.A. §2676 (1948), 60 STAT. 843, §410 (b) (1946), as amended,
61 STAT. 722 §410 (b) (1947), 28 U.S.C. §931 (b) (1946).
8628 U.S.C.A. §2402 (1948), 60 STAT. 843 §410 (a) (1946), as amended,
61 STAT. 722 §410 (a) (1947), 28 U.S.C. §931 (a) (1946).
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a prior bill expressly negatives such joinder . 7 Fourth, joinder has
been denied by the courts in actions under other acts permitting
suits against the United States 8
Joinder of parties plaintiff depends upon the congressional in-
tent plus' the fact that each plaintiff joined be a real party in
interest. An insurer which has paid its liability to its insured has
been held a real party in interest. 9
In an action for wrongful death where there was no eye witness
and the plaintiff failed to produce evidence of negligence or facts
from which negligence and causation by negligence might be in-
ferred, the complaint was considered insufficient as a matter of law
and was dismissed.9 0
Where an action was begun in a state court with the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation as defendant, removal to a federal
court, on the basis of the jurisdiction granted by the Tort Claims
Act required that the amount in controversy exceed $3,000.00.91
CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
Claims arising in a foreign country are exempted from" the cov-
'House Judiciary Committee Report on H.R. 181, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1945. "The bill, therefore, does not permit any person to be joined as
a defendant with the United States and does not lift the immunity of the
United States from tort actions except as jurisdiction is specifically con-
ferred upon the district courts by this bill."
88 a) actions under the Tucker Act, 36 STAT. 1093 (1911), 42 STAT. 311
(1921), 43 STAT. 348 (1924), 43 STAT. 972 (1925), 44 STAT. 121 (1926), 28
U.S.C. §41 (20) (1946).
b) actions under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46
U.S.C. §742 (1946). Defense Supplies Corp. v. United States Lines, 148 F.
2d 311 (C.C.A. 2d 1945) (But note that this case turned on the fact that
the United States was the real party in interest and was suing the United
States.' The plaintiff and defendant cannot be the same person, for in that
event there is no real case or controversy).
89 Hill v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Tex. 1947). Contra:
Gray v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 869 (D. Mass. 1948). This problem is
discussed further in this article under the heading "Derivative Claims",
infra p. 484.
90 Johnson v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. N.Y. 1947), aff'd. 168
F. 2d 886 (C.C.A. 2d 1948). See also, Colerick v. United States, 77 F. Supp.
953 (N.D. Fla. 1948) (Last clear chance doctrine not applied where the
government employee disregarded a traffic light, because plaintiff was
entitled to assume that the government's agent would obey the traffic
light); Lundy v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Fla. 1948) (Contribu-
tary negligence which is the proximate cause of the accident bars recovery).
I' Crowder v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., Civ. No. 4543, W.D. Mo.,
Feb. 18, 1947. 'Cf. Wickman v. Inland Waterways Corp., 78 F. Supp. 284
(D. Minn. 1948), where the court held that a Government corporation can
no longer be sued in its own name for tort. The Tort Claims Act provides
for the exclitsive remedy and the United States must be sued in its own
name.
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erage of the act 2  Three cases, however, have had to interpret
"foreign country." In the first of these cases, 93 plaintiff contended
that Newfoundland was not a foreign country but a possession
because the area where the claim arose was held by the United
States under a ninety-nine year lease. 4 The court held that New-
foundland is a foreign country, and Congress specifically limited
the meaning of "possessions" to those having district courts.95 The
second involved an accident occurring on Saipan, and the court
held that possession and control by reason of military conquest
and trusteeship by designation of the United Nations were insuffi-
cient to take it out of the exemption.9 6 The third involved an injury
to a member of the army of occupation in Belgium, and the court
held that "foreign country" means all lands other than those for
which Congress is the supreme legislative body, and the degree of
control exercised by the executive branch of the government is im-
material.9
7
LIABILITY GOVERNED BY STATE LAW
The act provides that the United States shall be liable "in ac-
cordance with the law of the place where the act or omission oc-
curred, '9 8 except that the United States shall not be liable for puni-
tive damages; but where state law provides only for punitive dam-
ages, the United State shall be liable for actual or compensatory
damages. 9 The United States shall be liable for interest only after
judgment."9
State law is controlling as to negligence. 0  Recovery is not
92 28 U.S.C.A. §2680 (k) (1948), 60 STAT. 845 §421 (k) (1946), 28 U.S.C.
§943 (k) (1946).
93 Spelar v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 967 (E.D. N.Y. 1948).
94 Relying on such construction given in a claim for wages under the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 60 STAT. 1095
(1946), 28 U.S.C. §201 (1946). Connell v. Vermilya-Brown Co., Inc., 164
F. 2d 924 (C.C.A. 2d 1947).
95 28 U.S.C.A. §1346 (b), 60 STAT. 843 §410 (a) (1946), as amended, 61
STAT. 722 §410 (a) (1947), 28 U.S.C. §931 (a) (1946).96 Brunell v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
97 Straneri v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
9828 U.S.C.A. §1346 (b) (1948) 60 STAT. 843 §410 (a) (1946), as
amended, 61 STAT. 722 §410 (a) (1947), 28 U.S.C. §931 (a) (1946).
9928 U.S.C.A. §2674, 60 STAT. 843 §410 (a) (1946), as amended, 61
STAT. 722 §410 (a) (1947), 28 U.S.C. §931 (a) (1946).
100 28 U.S.C.A. §§2411, 2674 (1948). 60 STAT. 843 §410 (a) (1946), as
amended, 61 STAT. 722 §410 (a) (1947), 28 U.S.C. §931 (a) (1946).
101 Spell v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Fla. 1947) (state law
makes it a duty to stop if blinded by the lights of an oncoming car and
failure to do so is negligence); Norton v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 278
(S.D. Tex. 1948); Parmiter v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 823 (D. Mass. 1948);
Barnett v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Fla. 1948).
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diminished on account of any insurance the claimant has re-
ceived.10 2 Notwithstanding the provision of the state law which
prevents an infant being charged with contributory negligence,
where the evidence shows that the infant's actions were the sole
proximate cause, there is no ground upon which the United States
may be held liable. 03
When an injury involves both property damage and personal
injuries and the complainant has been compensated for one, it be-
comes essential to determine whether there is one cause of action
for both 04 or whether there is a separate cause of action for
each.10 5 No problem is presented if the state courts have decided
the question; but where the state courts have not decided the ques-
tion, since there is no settled federal rule, it is assumed that the
state courts and the federal appellate courts would follow the ma-
jority rule that-there is one cause of action for both property dam-
age and personal injuries resulting from the single wrongful act. 06
The requirement of the local law that the plaintiff must establish
his freedom from contributory negligence is substantive and must
be app lied by the federal courts. 0 7 Therefore, in cases brought
under the Tort Claims Act in states where the plaintiff has the
burden of establishing his freedom from contributory negligence,
Rule 8 (c), 101 providing that contributory negligence is an affirma-
tive defense, is not applicable. 0 9
Federal courts follow the lex fori as to privileged communica-
tions,110 but a statement by the deceased, as to whether he saw the
car which struck "him, has no reasonable connection with the treat-
ment to be rendered by the attending physician and is not privi-
leged."' Under the Tort Claims Act, the law and terminology of
the forum should be applied as to res gestae."12
The measure and extent of damages is substantive and the law
102 Parmiter v. United States, supra note 101.
103 Madden v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 41 (N.D. Fla. 1948).
10 4 King v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R.R., 80 Minn., 83, 82 N.W. 1113 (1900).
105 Vasu v. Kohers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E. 2d 707 (1945).
105 Van Wie v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Iowa 1948); King
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R., supra note 104.
107 Van Wie v. United States, supra note 106; Ft. Dodge Hotel Co. v.
Bartlet, 119 F. 2d 253 (C.C.A. 8th 1941).
108 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. following §723 (c)
(1946).
109 Van Wie v. United States, supra note 106.
"10 Van Wie v. United States, supra note 106. Cf. Munger v. Swedish
American Lines, 35 F. Supp. 493 (S.D. N.Y. 1940); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
McAdoo, 106 F. 2d 618 (C.C.A. 8th 1939); Union P. R.R. v. Thomas, 152 Fed.
365 (C.C.A. 8th 1907).
I"* Van Wie v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Iowa 1948).
112 Ibid.
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of the place of injury must be applied., In applying the state law
to determine the measure of recovery, some unusual determina-
tions are obtainable. For example, in the Van Wie case,114 the court
applied rules set forth by Iowa courts and allowed probable future
accumulations less the current discount rate of a good sound in-
vestment; 115 and in the same case it was found that under the state
law, the personal' representative may not recover the amount ex-
pended for funeral expenses, but is entitled to interest, at the cur-
rent rate, on the amount so expended, for decedent's normal life
expectancy at time of his death.
In Massachusetts when an insurer by terms of its policy be-
comes a subrogee rather than assignee of the insured's claim, the
insurer is not entitled to the benefit of the statute permitting an
assignee under a written assignment to sue in his own name,"6 but
is relegated to its rights under the common law of Massachusetts
denying the right of a subrogee to sue the tortfeasor in his own
name."17
DERIVATIVE CLAIMS
There is a rather one-sided split of authority on the right of an
insurance company to sue the United States. The overwhelming
number of the reported district court cases permit such actions, 118
113Slater v. Mexican National R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904); Common-
wealth Fuel Co. v. McNeil, 103 Conn. 390, 130 Atl. 794 (1925).
114 See note 22 supra.
115 Stein v. Sharpe, 229 Iowa 812, 295 N.W. 155 (1940); In re Kees'
Estate, 31 N.W. 2d 380 (Iowa 1948).
116 MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 231, §5 (1933).
117 Gray v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 869 (D. Mass. 1948); Clark v.
Wilson, 103 Mass. 219 (1869). Cf. Southern R.R. v. Blunt & Ward, 165 Fed.
258 (S.D. Ala. 1908) (same result where value of subrogor's right exceeds
amount paid by him to insurer-subrogee).
11s a) Permitting derivative actions against the United States: Oahu
R.R. & Land Co. v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 707 (D. Hawaii 1947); Hill v.
United States, 74 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Tex, 1947); Wojciuk v. United States,
74 F. Supp: 914 (E.D. Wis. 1947); Forrester v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 272
(E.D. Wis 1947); Grace v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. N.Y. 1948);
Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. N.Y. 1948);
Insurance Co. of North America v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Va.
1948); Van Wie v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Iowa 1948); Town of
Amherst v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 80 (W.D. N.Y. 1948); State Road
Dept. of Florida v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 278 (N.D. Fla. 1948).
b) Denying derivative actions: Bewick v. United States, 74 F. Supp.
730 (N.D. Tex. 1947); McCasey v. United States (Unreported) (E.D. Mich.);
Cascade County v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 850 (D. Mont. 1948); Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. N.Y. 1948).
In Gray v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 869 (D. Mass. 1948) action brought
by an insurance company was dismissed, but for the reason that under
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and the only two circuit courts of appeals deciding the issue have
reversed lower court decisions denying the right.119
The government's contentions have been practically the same
in every case, namely, congressional intent, strict construction, and
anti-assignment act. Many cogent arguments have been advanced
by the courts permitting derivative suits to dispel the government's
objections, some of which follow: First, the words of the act indi-
cate a clear and sweeping waiver of immunity and a subrogee is a
claimant whose claim exists "on account of" damage to property. 20
Second, nothing supports the government's contention that Congress
intended the word "claimant" to refer only to the one originally
sustaining the loss or injury. The same phrase was utilized in the
Small Tort Claim Act"' under which subrogees' claims were con-
sistently approved by Congress.' 2' Third, had Congress intended to
exempt subrogees, it would undoubtedly have included subrogees
in the exempt categories of the act as it did in the Foreign Claims
Act. 23 Failure to exclude subrogation claims is strong evidence
of an intention to include them in view of the historical background
of the act.24 Fourth, the intent of Congress was to relieve its mem-
bers of the burden of considering hundreds of private claims at each
session. 25  Fifth, "a comparison of the Federal Torts Claims Act
with the Suits in Admirality Act may reasonably lead to the con-
clusion that the language of the Tort Claims Act is broader." 2- The
Massachusetts law a subrogee has no right to sue the tortfeasor in his own
name but the subrogee's rights are equitable in nature, entitling him to
sue the tortfeasor only in the name of the subrogor. By the terms of the
policy the insurance company became the subrogee rather than assignee.
I'D Employer's Fire Ins., Co. v. United States, 167 F. 2d 655 (C.C.A.
9th 1948), reversing 74 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Cal. 1947); Old Colony Ins. Co.
v. United States, 168 F. 2d 931 (C.C.A. 6th 1948) reversing 74 F. Supp. 723
(S.D. Ohio 1947).
12060 STAT. 843 §410 (a) (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 722 §410 (a)
(1947), 28 U.S.C. §931 (a) (1946). In the present form, 28 U.S.C.A. §1346
(1948), the words "on account of" are omitted. Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v.
United States, supra note 119; Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, supra
note 118 (a).
12142 STAT. 1066 (1922), 31 U.S.C. §215 (1940).
122 Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, supra note 119; Wojciuk
v. United States, supra note 118 (a); Niagara Fire Ins. Co, v. United States,
supra note 118 (a). H. R. REP. No. 2655, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. 5, 13 (1946).
123 31 U.S.C. §224 (d) (1946); "including claims of insured but exclud-
ing claims of subrogees." Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, supra
note 119; Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, swra note 118 (a); Insur-
ance Co. of North America v. United States, supra note 118 (a).
124 36 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 553 (1932); Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. United
States, supra note 119; Insurance Co. of North America v. United States,
supra note 118 (a).
'-'Forrester v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 272 (E.D. Wis. 1947).
120 Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 167 F. 2d 655, 657 (C.C.A.
9th 1948).
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Suits in Admiralty Act covers claims of subrogees.12 7  Regulations
promulgated by the War Department for guidance in administrative
settlement of claims, provide that claims otherwise valid shall not
be rejected merely because the claimant has been paid by an in-
surer. A claim in the name of a subrogated insurer shall be de-
termined and paid under local law.128 Sixth, where a statute con-
tains a clear and sweeping waiver of immunity from suit on all
claims with certain well-defined exceptions, resort to strict con-
struction cannot be had to enlarge the exceptions.' Seventh, the
anti-assignment act'3" has reference only to voluntary assignments
of claims against the United States, and not to transfers of title by
operation of law.18 1 The purpose of the Assignment of Claims
Act 132 is to protect the United States against loss of defenses which
it has to claims by an assignor which might not be applicable to an
assignee. Such defenses are expressly reserved under the Tort
Claims Act.133 Subrogation is not an assignment to a stranger which
might possibly bring into play the anti-assignment statute.134 Sub-
rogation is the enforcement of the original claim and is the injured
person's claim although enforced by another.1 35 Eight, multiplicity
of suits cannot occur because both insured and insurer are bound
by the adjudication.1 36 Ninth, if the government's view were
adopted, the effect could easily and legitimately be avoided either
by the insurer's stipulation that the insured sue the United States
1.27Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, supra note 126; For-
rester v. United States, suvpra note 125.
128 U. S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE 2106 et seq. (1947); Grace v.
United States, 76 F. Supp. 174 (D. Md. 1948).
1" Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, supra note 126; Niagara
Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. N.Y. 1948); Insurance
Co. of North America v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Va. 1948).
130R.S. §3477 (2d ed. 1878), 35 STAT. 411 (1908), 54 STAT. 1029 (1940),
31 U.S.C. §203 (1946).
131 Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, supra note 126; Hill v.
United States, 74 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Tex. 1947); Wojciuk v. United States,
74 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Wis. 1947); Forrester v. United States, 75 F. Supp.
272 (E.D. Wis. 1947); Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, supra note 129;
Grace v. United States, supra note 128; Insurance Co. of North America v.
United States, supra note 129; National Bank of Commerce v. Downie, 218
U.S. 345 (1910); Martin v. National Surety Co., 300 U.S. 588 (1937); Mc-
Kenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365 (1945).
132 See note 130 supra.
183 28 U.S.C.A. §1346 (b,c) (1948), 60 STAT. 844 §411 (1946), 28 U.S.C.
§932 (1946). Grace v. United States, supra note 128, State Road Dept. of
Florida v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 278 (N.D. Fla. 1948) (Counter-
claim by the United States).
134 Forrester v. United States, supra note 131.
13 Insurance Co. of North America v. United States, supra note 129;
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 166 U.S. 468 (1897).
136 Forrester v. United States, supra note 131.
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as a prerequisite to recovery against the insurer, or by making a
loan and bringing an action in the name of the insured. 3 A direct
suit is not contrary to any policy of the United States.138
The four cases denying the right to brini derivative suits have
followed the same lines of reasoning but reach a different result.
The Assignment of Claims Act 39 "strikes at every derivative in-
terest, in whatever form acquired and incapacitates every claimant
upon the government from creating an interest in the claim in any
other than himself."'1 0  If the subrogation agreement were volun-
tarily carried out it would violate the statute; and were the insured
to refuse and the insurance company to be subrogated by operation
of law, there would still be a violation of the statute.'4 ' "It embraces
alike legal and equitable assignments.' '4 2
The contention that the anti-assignment statute does not apply
when there has been a transfer of title by operation of law 43 applies
only when the title to property passes and does not encompass an
assignment of an action in tort against the United States.44 One of
the primary reasons for the anti-assignment statute was to protect
the government from multiplication of the number of persons with
whom it must deal; therefore, if permitted under the Tort Claims
Act, it is contrary to the intent of the act.14 5
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not permitted by the
exclusions of the Tort Claims Act, since that section'46 is one of
restriction upon the consent granted by the government and not one
of enlargement.147  The right io sue the government must be de-
137 Luckenbach v. McCahan Sugar Co., 248 U.S. 139 (1918); The Plow
City, 122 F. 2d 816 (C.C.A. 3d 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 798 (1941); State
Road Dept. of Florida v. United States, supra note 133.
138 Insurance Co. of North America v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 951
(E.D. Va. 1948).
2'39 31 U.S.C. §203 (1946): "... shall be absolutely null and void, unless
they are freely made and executed in the presence of at least two attesting
witnesses, after the allowance of such a claim, the ascertainment of the
amount due, and the issuing of a warrant for the payment thereof." (Em-
phasis supplied).
14ONational Bank of Commerce v. Downie, 218 U.S. 345, 353 (1910);
Cascade County v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 850 (D. Mont. 1948).
'41 Cascade County v. United States, supra note 140; Bewick v. United
States, 74 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Tex. 1947).
142 National Bank of Commerce v. Downie, supra note 140 at 353.
',3 Western Pacific Co. v. United States, 268 U.S. 271 (1925); United
States v. Gillis, 95 U.S. 407 (1877).
' "Cascade County v. United States, supra note 140.
14 Cascade County v. United States, supra note 140. See Goodman v.
Niblack, 102 U.S. 556 (1880).
14-628 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (1948), 60 STAT. 845 §421 (1946), 28 U.S.C. §943
(1946).
147 Cascade County v. United States, supra note 140.
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termined solely from the section granting the right and not by
negative implication from the specific exemptions. The Act is for
the benefit of the citizens and is so restricted.14 s To hold that the
grant to claimants for damage, loss, injury, or death includes claims
of a subrogee would do violence to the language of the statute 14 9
which, as a waiver of sovereign immunity, must be strictly con-
strued.' Nor can it be shown that there is a close analogy be-
tween the Tort Claims Act and the Suits in Admiralty Act which
provides for the bringing of a libel in personam against the United
States in cases where "a proceeding in Admiralty could be main-
tained"'1 against private owners.152
DAMAGES
The goal of virtually every civil action is to recover damages.
The number of claims filed and the amount asked in the two fiscal
years since the Tort Claims Act became effective will be found in
the table following. In 179 cases disposed of, as of March 31,
1948, the United States had already been held liable for a total
of $993,186.07, with 402 cases filed in 1947 still pending and all of
the 1058 cases filed in 1948 still pending.
The individual claims have varied from $163.28113 to three
claims totaling $18,917,878.0015 for property damage and injuries re-
sulting from the Texas City disaster of 1947. It is too early to
draw any conclusions of the comparative merit of trial by court
and trial by jury in the allowance of damages. The plaintiff has
been held to be entitled to damages for physical injuries, pain,
suffering, medical expenses, and property damage.165 Loss of earn-
ings has been allowed where the injured person suffered such loss.15 6
148 Bewick v. United States, supra note 141.
-49 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 333
(E.D.N.Y. 1948).
150 Cascade County v. United States, supra note 140; Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co. v. United States, supra note 149.
15141 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §742 (1946).
152 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, swpra note 149.
153 Civ. No. 10,067, D. N.J., dismissed Nov. 14, 1947.
154 Civ. No. 535--$8,000,000.00, Civ. No. 666-$9,500,553.00, Civ. No.
667-$1,417,325.00; District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Gal-
veston, Texas, filed in fiscal year ending June 1948.
155 McMullan v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 164 (E.D. N.Y. 1947); Camp-
bell v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1948); Parmiter v. United
States, 75 F. Supp. 823 (D. Mass. 1948); Bickley v. United States, 77 F.
Supp. 454 (E.D. S.C. 1948); Colerick v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 953
(N.D. Fla. 1948).
156 Norton v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 278 (S.D. Tex. 1948) (al-
lowed profits plaintiff would probably have made in real estate transac-
tions); McMullan v. United States, supra note 155; Bickley v. United
States, supra note 155; Colerick v. United States, supra note 155; Barnett
v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Fla. 1948).
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One case has allowed future nursing expenses for the life expec-
tancy of the plaintiff and future anticipated medical expenses. 5 '
The only reported case involving the death of an infant allowed
damages for loss of the child's earning capacity during minority less
cost of maintenance, funeral expenses, and loss of association.
15 8
Recovery is not to be diminished on account of any insurance the
plaintiff may have received,"" but the Act requires that the court
determine the amount of attorney's fees- not to exceed 20% of
the recovery -which must be paid out of the award but not in
addition to it. 60
At the present time there are sixteen cases pending in the vari-
ous circuit courts of appeals. No case has been appealed to the
Court of Claims,'"' and no cases -are pending in the Supreme Court
of the United States. 1 2
William Bentle Devaney, Jr.
August 2, 1946- June 30, 1947
Number Number [ R
of CassI of Caes I Tota] Recovery
With o Without Amounts Asked In 179 Cases
Total Sttd Stated Under Cases With As Of
Nature of Actin Claims mounts ount Stated Amounts arch 31, 1948
Personal injury - I I
motor vehicle 414 286 128 $ 7,330,096.78
Personal injury- 1 7
other 140 74 66 2,306,476.13
Personal property I
damage 84 56 28 1,223,338.01
Real property damage 16 ] 13 3 106,698.00 1
654 j 429 225 j $10,966,608.92 $993,186.07
'1, Campbell v. United States, supra note 155. See also Colerick v.
United States, supra note 155.
'
5 8 Wilscam v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 581 (D. Hawaii 1948).
159 Parmiter v. United States, supra note 155.
16028 U.S.C.A. §2678 (1948), 60 STAT. 846 §422 (1946), 28 U.S.C. §944
(1946). Provision of the act is permissive--"may allow"-and not man-
datory. .Spell v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Fla. 1947); Norton
v. United States, supra note 156.
161 28 U.S.C.A. §1504 (1948), 60 STAT. 844 §412 (1946), 28 U.S.C. §933
(1946).
102 Information furnished by Mr. H. G. Morrison, Assistant Attorney
General, Claims Division, Department of Justice, in a letter dated August
5, 1948.
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July 1, 1947 -March 31, 1948
Number Number
of Cases of Cases Total Recovery
With Without Amounts Asked In 179 Cases
Total Stated Stated Under Cases With As Of
Nature of Action Claims Amounts 5 mounts* Stated Amounts March 31, 1948
Personal injury- I I
motor vehicle I 411 354 57 $ 8,408,141.55 $993,186.07
Personal injury - 253 I 3 2
other 253 222 31 23,070,085.15
Personal property IQ9 89 20
damage I__9_8 20 985,759.81
Real Property damage 285 75 210 j 10,460,830.46 1
1058 I 740 318 $42,924,816.97 L $993,186.07
This information was supplied by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and
was compiled by Mr. W. B. Devaney, Sr.
*Previously the courts were not required by the administrative office to indicate the
amount of damages asked. So far as it can be determined, there was a specific amount asked in
each of these cases.
Cases filed August 2, 1946- June 30, 1947
Pending (March 31, 1948) ------------------------- 402
Court trial ------------------------------------- 122
Consent ------------------------------------------ 46
Settled ------------------------------------------- 4
Removed to State Court ---------------------------- 1
Dismissed ---------------------------------------- 79
654
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